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Rich people, women, and healthy people live longer. We document that this heterogeneity in life expectancy
is large, and we use an estimated structural model to assess its effect on the elderly's saving. We find
that the differences in life expectancy related to observable factors such as income, gender, and health
have large effects on savings, and that these factors contribute by similar amounts. We also show that
the risk of outliving one's expected lifespan has a large effect on the elderly's saving behavior.
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Albany, NY 12222
jbjones@csc.albany.eduRich people, women, and healthy people live much longer than their poor, male, and sick
counterparts. Two extremes, taken from our analysis of single people in the Assets and Health
Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset, illustrate this point: an unhealthy 70 year old
male at the 20th percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live only 6 more
years, that is to age 76. In contrast, a healthy 70 year old woman at the 80th percentile of the
permanent income distribution expects to live 16 more years, thus making it to age 86.1 Such
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in life expectancy could, all else equal, lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
saving behavior.
A related observation is that people with high permanent incomes keep large amounts of
assets very late in life. Table 1, also based on the AHEAD data, shows percentage changes in
median assets between 1995 and 2002 for the single individuals who were still alive in 2002.
Table 1 shows the change for each permanent income quintile in two diﬀerent birth year cohorts.
As permanent income grows, asset decumulation declines. In the older cohort, the poorest group
consumes over 98 percent of their assets (admittedly a small amount) between 1995 and 2002,
while the top group increases their assets by 3 percent.
Table 1—Percentage Change in
Median Assets, 1995-2002, by Cohort
and Permanent Income Quintile






Combining these two observations begs the question of how much of the asset accumulation
of old rich people is due to longer life expectancy. To study this question, we use a previously
developed and estimated model of elderly singles’ saving behavior (see Mariacristina De Nardi,
Eric French, and John B. Jones (2006)). Using a structural model allows us to disentangle the
1For additional evidence on the links between permanent income and mortality, see Orazio P. Attanasio and
Carl Emmerson (2003) and Angus Deaton and Christina Paxson (2001). Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden,
and Angela Merrill (2001) provide evidence on the links between health status and mortality.
2eﬀects of life expectancy from other inﬂuences on old age saving, especially medical expendi-
tures, that also vary by sex, age, health and permanent income. Our previous work shows that
our model ﬁts the data well, providing reassurance in our model’s predictions.
In that paper we also document that an important reason why the income rich elderly run
down their assets slowly is the high level of medical expenses faced by these people. In this
paper we concentrate on how variations in life expectancy by health, gender, and permanent
income aﬀect asset holdings during retirement for a given proﬁle of medical expenditures.2 We
ﬁnd that all of these eﬀects are important for understanding the saving of the elderly and they
are each of roughly the same order of magnitude.
In addition to systematic diﬀerences due to gender, health and income, variations in lifespan
reﬂect a signiﬁcant amount of idiosyncratic risk. For example, while the average lifespan of
unhealthy males at the 20th percentile of the permanent income distribution is 6 years, 8 percent
of these individuals will live for at least 15 years. We show that the risk of outliving one’s net
worth has a large eﬀect on the elderly’s saving behavior.
I. The Model
Consider a retired person seeking to maximize expected lifetime utility from consumption c at
age t, t = tr+1,...,T, where tr is the retirement age and T is the maximum lifespan. The ﬂow




, ν ≥ 0.
The two key determinants of the household’s ability to spend are its net worth, at, and its
annuity (non-asset) income, yt. Annuity income is a deterministic function of sex, g, permanent
income, I, and age, t:
(2) yt = y(g,I,t).
In this context, permanent income should be thought of as lifetime earnings, or a monotonic
2In a complementary exercise that does not account for medical expenses, Li Gan, Guan Gong, Michael Hurd
and Daniel McFadden (2004) analyze how diﬀerences in self-reported subjective survival probabilities aﬀect the
elderly’s saving.
3transformation thereof; people with higher lifetime earnings will receive higher annuity income
upon retirement.
The individual faces several exogenous sources of risk.
1) Health status uncertainty, with transition probabilities that depend on previous health,
sex, permanent income and age.
2) Survival uncertainty. Let sg,h,I,t denote the probability that an individual of sex g is alive
at age t + 1, conditional on being alive at age t, having time-t health status h, and enjoying
permanent income I.
3) Medical expense uncertainty. Medical costs, mt, are deﬁned as out-of-pocket costs. They
depend upon sex, health status, permanent income, age and an idiosyncratic component, ψt:
(3) lnmt = m(g,h,I,t) + σ(g,h,I,t) × ψt.
Following Daniel Feenberg and Jonathan Skinner (1994) and Eric French and John B. Jones (2004),
we assume
ψt = ζt + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ξ), (4)
ζt = ρmζt−1 + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ǫ), (5)
where ξt and ǫt are serially and mutually independent.
Timing: at the beginning of the period the individual’s health status and medical costs are
realized. The individual then consumes and saves. Finally the survival shock hits.
The evolution of net worth is given by
(6) at+1 = at + yn(rat + yt,τ) + bt − mt − ct,
where yn(rat + yt,τ) denotes post-tax income, r denotes the risk-free, pre-tax rate of return,
the vector τ describes the tax structure, and bt denotes government transfers.
The consumer faces a standard borrowing constraint: at+1 ≥ 0. Following Glenn R. Hub-
bard, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes (1994, 1995), we assume that government
transfers bridge the gap between an individual’s total resources and the “consumption ﬂoor” c:
(7) bt = max{0,c + mt − [at + yn(rat + yt,τ)]},
4If bt > 0, then ct = c and at+1 = 0.
To save on state variables, we follow Angus Deaton (1991) and redeﬁne the problem in terms
of cash-on-hand:
(8) xt = at + yn(rat + yt,τ) + bt − mt.
All of the variables in xt are given and known at the beginning of period t.











(9) xt+1 = xt − ct + yn
￿
r(xt − ct) + yt+1,τ
￿
+ bt+1 − mt+1.
To enforce the consumption ﬂoor and borrowing constraint, we have
(10) xt ≥ c, ct ≤ xt.
II. Data, Estimation, and Preference Parameter Values
The AHEAD is a sample of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 70 or older in 1993. The
survivors in the sample were interviewed again in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002.
The AHEAD has information on the value of housing and real estate, automobiles, privately-
held businesses, IRAs, Keoghs, and other ﬁnancial assets. Our measure of net worth is the sum
of these items, less mortgages and other debts. The AHEAD also provides a measure of annuity
income (the sum of social security payments, deﬁned beneﬁt payments, veteran’s beneﬁts and
food stamps). We deﬁne permanent income as average annuity income over all periods the
individual is observed. Our health status indicator is taken from the AHEAD’s self-reported
subjective health measure. Medical expenses are total out-of-pocket expenditures, including
insurance premia and nursing home care. Attrition for reasons other than death is relatively
rare, hence we can use the AHEAD data to estimate mortality rates.
In De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006), we estimated the model using a two-step strategy. In
5the ﬁrst step, we estimated those parameters that could be cleanly identiﬁed without explicitly
using the model, such as the mortality, health transition, annuity income, and medical expense
proﬁles.
In the second step, we estimated the remaining parameters with the method of simulated
moments, by matching simulated and observed asset medians over the period 1995-2002. Group-
ing individuals by birth-year and permanent income, we calculated the median net worth of the
surviving individuals in each cohort-income cell in each year. Our parameter estimates were
the values that produced the best ﬁt between the cell medians produced by model simulations
and the cell medians found in the data.
Updating the model in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006) with newer versions of the
AHEAD data, we ﬁnd the following parameter values. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
(ν) is 4.77, the discount factor (β) is 0.955, and the consumption ﬂoor (c) is $2,729. The interest
rate (r) is calibrated to 2 percent.
III. Results
A. Life Expectancy
Using the AHEAD data, we estimate the probability of being alive, and if alive, the probability
of being in good health, conditional on health status last year, permanent income and sex.
Beginning at age 70 with the empirical distribution of health, permanent income and sex, we
use these estimated processes to simulate demographic histories. Table 2 presents our estimated
life expectancies.
Permanent income, health and gender have similar eﬀects on life expectancy. A typical
person at the 80th permanent income percentile on average lives 3.1 years longer than a person
at the 20th percentile. Healthy people on average live 3.2 years longer than unhealthy people,
and women on average live 4.6 years longer than men.3
With incomplete annuitization, one potential reason why some elderly run down their assets
slowly is uncertainty over their lifespans. Table 3 shows the probability of living to ages 85 and
95, conditional on being alive at age 70. For example, a healthy woman at the 80th percentile of
3Our predicted life expectancy is lower than what the aggregate statistics imply. These diﬀerences are an
artifact of using data on singles only: when we re-estimate the model for both couples and singles we ﬁnd that
our predicted life expectancy is very close to the aggregate statistics.
6Table 2—Life Expectancy in Years, Conditional on
Being Alive at Age 70
Income Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Percentile Male Male Female Female All
20 8.1 6.3 13.4 11.7 11.7
40 8.9 7.0 14.3 12.7 12.6
60 9.9 7.9 15.4 13.8 13.6







the permanent income distribution, who expects to live to age 86 on average, faces a 14 percent
chance of living 25 years, to age 95. Even an unhealthy man at the 20th percentile faces an 8
percent chance of living to age 85, more than twice his expected lifespan of 6.3 years. The risk
of living far past one’s expected lifespan is large.
B. Net Worth
To better understand how variation in life expectancy aﬀects saving, we simulate the net worth
of the AHEAD birth-year cohort whose members were ages 72-76 (with an average age of
74) in 1995. We take the initial distribution of net worth, permanent income, health status,
medical expenses, and sex from the 1995 AHEAD data. Thus in our simulations those with
high permanent income are likely to begin with high net worth and good health, just as in the
data. We then use the estimated processes and decision rules to project out the median net
worth of everyone in the sample until the last period the model allows them to be alive, age 99.
Because those with low wealth and income have higher mortality rates, and because we
model this explicitly, attrition from our simulated sample would not be random. Instead, we
construct proﬁles with no attrition, so that the composition of the simulated sample is ﬁxed over
7Table 3—Percent Living to Ages 85 and 95,
Conditional on Being Alive at Age 70
Income Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Percentile Male Male Female Female All
Percent living to age 85
20 12.3 8.2 39.2 32.5 31.4
40 15.8 10.8 44.0 37.6 36.3
60 20.3 14.5 49.9 43.5 41.6
80 26.0 19.4 55.8 49.7 47.5
Percent living to age 95
20 0.8 0.5 7.2 6.0 5.4
40 1.1 0.8 8.7 7.5 6.9
60 1.7 1.2 10.9 9.4 8.7
80 2.5 1.9 13.8 12.3 10.9
the entire sample period. This allows us to track the saving of the same people over time. Thus,
the asset proﬁles we show are those of agents who have realistic mortality expectations—and
save on the basis of these expectations—but do not die until age 100.
The solid line in Figure 1 displays the net worth proﬁles generated by our baseline param-
eterization. Consistent with the evidence presented in Table 1, the net worth of the lowest
permanent income quintile is close to zero and hence does not even show up on the graph. The
households in this permanent income group rely on their annuitized income and the government
consumption ﬂoor to ﬁnance their retirement. All other households seem to decumulate their
net-worth very slowly, with those in the highest permanent income group starting oﬀ at $160,000
in median net worth at age 74, and retaining over $100,000 until well over age 90. Again, this is
consistent with the evidence. Our ﬁnding that the income rich elderly run down their net worth
at a very slow rate complements and conﬁrms those of Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and
Stephen P. Zeldes (2004), who look both at younger and older households but do not have as
many observations as we do on the very elderly.



















Figure 1. Median Net Worth under Different Mortality Assumptions
Notes: —-: baseline. – · –: everyone in bad health. – –: everyone male and in bad health.
–+—+–: everyone low permanent income, male, and in bad health.
C. The Eﬀects of Heterogenous Mortality and Lifespan Risk on Net Worth
The other lines in Figure 1 make more and more pessimistic assumptions about how long people
expect to live, allowing us to isolate the eﬀect of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in mortality
rates on saving. We do this by changing the survival probabilities sg,h,I,t used to ﬁnd the
individuals’ decision rules, but leaving everything else unchanged.
The dashed-dot line adjusts each individual’s survival probabilities to those of someone who
is always in bad health and has no chance of going back to good health. The implied drop in
life expectancy is 2-4 years, depending on gender and PI. This lower life expectancy generates a
noticeable fall in net worth. The largest eﬀect in terms of asset accumulation is for the highest
PI households. For people aged 90 and older who are in the highest permanent income quintile,
assets decrease around $15,000.
The dashed line assumes that, besides being always sick, everyone has the life expectancy of
9a male, which at age 70 is 4-5 years less than that of a female. This change in life expectancy
generates a large drop in asset holdings for the three highest PI quintiles, again, with the richest
quintile experiencing the largest drop. For people aged 90 and older that are in the top quintile,
being always sick and male generates an average drop of over $30,000.
Finally, the crossed line adds the eﬀect of being at the lowest possible PI level to all of
the other eﬀects on life expectancy. This implies that every 70-year-old expects to live 5 more
years, although he still faces the risk of living much longer, producing another large drop in
assets. For people aged 90 and older who are in the highest permanent income quintile, having
the mortality rates of a sick, low-income male generates an average drop of over $50,000, which
is about one-third of their initial assets.
In summary, diﬀerences in life expectancy related to health, gender, and permanent income
are important to understanding savings patterns across these groups, and the eﬀect of each
factor is of a similar order of magnitude.



















Figure 2. Median Net Worth under Different Mortality Assumptions
Notes: –+—+–: everyone low permanent income, male, and in bad health. –⊖–: everyone low
permanent income, male, in bad health, and with a certain lifespan.
10To assess the eﬀects of lifespan uncertainty, Figure 2 shows two sets of simulations. The
crossed line shows predicted net worth when everyone faces the mortality rates of a man with
low permanent income who is in bad health. This man has an expected lifespan of 5 years, but
faces the risk of living much longer. The circle-dash line eliminates this risk; all individuals
in these simulations expect to live exactly 5 years, then die. When the risk of living longer
than 5 years is eliminated, so is the value of having assets after 5 years, and individuals deplete
their net worth by the end of their ﬁfth year. In contrast, most individuals facing uncertain
lifespans still have signiﬁcant asset holdings after 5 years, even when facing the most pessimistic
survival prospects. This comparison shows that at realistic levels of annuitization the risk of
living beyond one’s expected lifespan has huge eﬀects on saving.
D. How Do Medical Expenses Aﬀect Our Results?
Our previous work has shown that medical expenses rise with age, and much more so for retirees
with high permanent income. For example, in our current model the average medical expenses
of an unhealthy woman at the 80th percentile of the permanent income distribution rise from
$1,000 a year at age 70 to $18,000 a year at age 95. This feature of the data proves crucial to
explaining the asset decumulation of the elderly. One might wonder whether medical expenses
also aﬀect how assets vary with life expectancy.
Figure 3 shows the asset proﬁles when there is lifespan uncertainty but no medical costs.
The solid line displays asset proﬁles for the baseline life expectancy case, while the crossed line
refers to the case in which everyone has the life expectancy of a sick, poor, and male person.
For the richest people this amounts to a reduction in life expectancy of more than 7 years.
Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 1 reveals two notable changes. First, the model with no medical
costs implies a much faster rate of asset decumulation. Second, when there are no medical
expenses the eﬀects of changing life expectancy are much smaller in absolute terms, but much
larger in relative terms. In absence of medical expenses giving the richest people the mortality
rates of a sick, low-income male reduces assets at age 85 by $32,000. Figure 1 shows that with
medical expenses the reduction is $50,000. The $32,000 reduction, however, translates into a
decrease of over 70 percent, while the $50,000 reduction translates into a decrease of 40 percent.
Medical expenses increasing with age and permanent income prop up old age savings for
the richest. When life expectancy is decreased the rich retirees are less likely to survive to very
old age and face very large medical expenses. This has a large eﬀect on their level of savings.



















Figure 3. Median Net Worth under Different Mortality Assumptions when
There Are No Medical Expenses
Notes: —-: baseline. –+—+–: everyone low permanent income, male, and in bad health.
On the other hand, removing medical expenses altogether greatly reduces total savings, which
were used to insure against both life span risk and medical costs. For this reason, the change in
life expectancy has a larger impact in percentage terms then when there are no out-of-pocket
medical expenses.
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